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I.

INTRODUCTION

At the outset, it should be noted that the incivility and lack of respect State Farm Fire
and Casualty Company ("State Farm") shows to its insureds, D. Richard Linford and
Lindsey Linford (the "Linfords"), in its Respondent's Brief is indicative of State Farm's
treatment of the Linfords throughout this entire dispute.
On January 19,2007, the Linfords' horne in Boise, Idaho (the "Horne") was damaged in a
fire. (R. pp. 92, 268). At the time of the fire, the Horne was insured by a homeowner's insurance
policy (the "Policy") issued by State Farm. (R. pp. 93, 364). On March 20, 2007, the Linfords
entered into a written contract with Dave's Inc., a local general contractor ("Dave's"), to repair
the damage the Horne sustained as a result of the fire (the "Fire Damage Contract"). (R. pp. 9,
14, 365). On May 9, 2007, the Linfords entered into a separate written contract with Dave's to
remodel the non-fire damaged portions of the Horne (the "Remodeling Contract"). (R. p. 9, 20).
On April 25, 2008, Dave's completed its repair work under the Fire Damage Contract. (R. p. 9).
Dave's then filed its Complaint against the Linfords, alleging breaches of both the Fire Damage
Contract and the Remodeling Contract. (R. p. 7). The Linfords tendered the defense of Dave's
lawsuit relating to the Fire Damage Contract to State Farm on two separate occasions. (R. pp.
40, 326-30). State Farm rejected both tenders of defense. (R. p. 40-41). During the litigation
between the Linfords and State Farm, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
State Farm and entered a judgment resolving all claims against State Farm. (R. p. 376). The
Linfords then appealed the district court's judgment after the district court certified the judgment
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as final pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(b). (R. pp. 380,383).

It is undisputed that the Linfords only wanted the fire damage to the home repaired.
(R. p. 269).

State Farm, however, attempts to paint the picture that the Linfords were

seeking to obtain some sort of financial windfall from the fire that disrupted their lives. For
instance, State Farm states that the Linfords only paid Dave's "$173,369.99 under the Fire
Damage Contract." (Respondent's Brief, p. 34.).

First, this amount is incorrect.

After

providing the incorrect amount the Linfords paid Dave's, State Farm then postulates that all
of the Linfords' arguments fail because "State Farm could have paid [the Linfords
$173,369.99J as the amount actually and necessarily spent to repair fire damage at the time
of the appraisal."

(ld.).

This last assertion is either an obvious attempt to tarnish the

reputation of the Linfords or simply overlooks the record.
The Linfords entered into two written contracts with Dave's. The first contract was
the Fire Damage Contract, which was executed on March 20, 2007, to repair the damage the
Home sustained as a result of the fire.

(R. pp. 9, 14, 365). The second contract was the

Remodeling Contract, which was executed on May 9, 2007, to remodel the non-fire damaged
portions of the Home. (R. p. 9, 20). The amount due under the Fire Damage Contract is the only
issue remaining between Dave's and the Linfords because Dave's has admitted that the amount
owed to it under the Remodeling Contract was $48,721.23. (R. p. 77). The October 13, 2010
appraisal found that the amount of loss relating to the fire damage as of the date of loss (J anuary
19, 2007) would have been estimated to be $205,757.63 (R. p. 217). Therefore, based upon
Dave's admission and the appraisal, the total amount due and owing to Dave's for its work under
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both the Fire Damage Contract and the Remodeling Contract would be $254,478.86. 1
The undisputed total amount the Linfords paid to Dave's under both the Fire Damage
Contract and the Remodeling Contract was $232,884.27. (R. pp. 76-77). However, the Linfords
directly paid for $37,571.50 worth of construction items that were used by Dave's to repair the
fire damage to the Horne, $23,668.68 of which Dave's does not dispute. (R. p. 76). Even using
the undisputed $23,668.68, the total amount the Linfords paid to repair the fire damage and
remodel the Horne exceeds $254,478.86. 2 Nonetheless, Dave's still seeks damages in excess of
$91,000. (R. p. 52). Based upon Dave's admission as to the value of the Remodeling Contract,
these damages must relate to the Fire Damage Contract.
The primary argument advanced by the Linfords is that if Dave's prevails and is awarded
any additional funds by the trier of fact, State Farm will not have paid the amount the Linfords
"actually and necessarily" spend to repair the Horne, as required under the Policy. Should the
Linfords prevail against Dave's, then State Farm will have met its obligation to pay the amount
the Linfords "actually and necessarily" spent to repair the Home. However, until the trier of fact

Dave's disputes that the appraisal is binding on it. (R. p. 52).
To clarify, State Farm paid the Linfords the estimated actual cash value of the loss shortly after the fire damage
occurred. State Farm revised its estimate several times and paid the Linfords additional amounts based upon the
revised estimates. The Linfords then used the funds they received from State Farm to pay Dave's. Before the
appraisal was performed, State Farm had paid the Linfords a total of $197,065.67 to repair the fire damage to the
Home. (R. p. 76). Of the $197,065.67 the Linfords received from State Farm, $159,494.17 was paid by the Linfords
directly to Dave's and the Linfords used the remaining $37,571.50 to purchase construction materials that were used
to repair the fire damage to the Home. (R. p. 76). The Linfords then paid Dave's $73,390.10 out of their personal
funds under the Remodeling Contract. (R. p. 77). Dave's admits that the value of its work under the Remodeling
Contract was $48,721.23, and based on this admission, the Linfords over paid Dave's by $24,668.87. (ld.). The
reason why the Linfords overpaid Dave's on the Remodeling Contract was because Dave's did not separate the work
it performed under the Fire Damage Contract and the Remodeling Contract and the Linfords were forced to estimate
the amount they should pay under the Remodeling Contract. (R. pp. 76-77). After Dave's answered the Linfords'
discovery requests, the Linfords became aware that they overpaid Dave's on the Remodeling Contract and filed a
I

2
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determines whether Dave's was fairly compensated, State Farm's obligations remain. Moreover,
given that only the value of the Fire Damage Contract is in dispute, only the amount due under
the Fire Damage Contract, and by extension, the amount covered by the Linfords' homeowners
insurance, is at issue.
Despite these undisputed facts, all of which are in the record, State Farm argues that the
Linfords are somehow acting in bad faith.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

It is

undisputed that the Linfords overpaid Dave's the amount due under the Remodeling Contract.
(R. p. 77). The Linfords attempted to mediate the dispute between Dave's and State Farm. (R. p.

269). Nonetheless, Dave's sued the Linfords. After being sued, the Linfords twice tendered
defense of the action to State Farm (R. pp. 40, 326-30), and State Farm rejected both tenders of
defense. (R. p. 40-41). The Linfords then agreed to comply with the Policy and enter into the
appraisal process.

(R. p. 112). The Linfords acted honorably and in compliance with their

agreements with both Dave's and State Farm throughout the entire process. In fact, the Linfords
overpaid Dave's under the Remodeling Contract in order not to get any unfair benefit from State
Farm. For their actions, the Linfords were rewarded with a lawsuit by their contractor to recover
monies that should be paid by their insurer.

State Farm's reaction to these unfortunate

circumstances was to fight the Linfords, rather than to defend (or even assist) them against
Dave's. Finally, when the Linfords appealed the district court's decision, State Farm's reaction
is to belittle, insult and challenge the credibility of the Linfords by misrepresenting the record in
an apparent attempt to damage the reputation of the Linfords. As always, the Linfords simply
counterclaim. (R. p. 77).
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want their Horne repaired and for State Farm to pay the amount the Linfords "actually and
necessarily" spend to repair the fire damage to their Horne in compliance with the Policy. As
discussed below, the law supports such a determination.

II.
A.

ARGUMENT

State Farm Has Not Met Its Duty to Indemnify for the Fire Loss to the Home.
There is no dispute that State Farm had a duty to indemnify the Linfords for the fire loss

to the Home. (Respondent's Brief, p. 21). Instead, the present dispute revolves around whether
State Farm has met that duty.
State Farm argues that the June 11, 2012 letter agreement (the "Letter Agreement"),
whereby the parties agreed to hire an appraiser to "determine the cost to repair damages to the
dwelling, caused by the fire, ... on the date of loss," settled all outstanding claims between
State Farm and the Linfords. (R. p. 188) (emphasis added). This argument, however, completely
ignores the actual terms of the Letter Agreement and the Policy. Before analyzing that language,
it is important first to briefly frame the parties' arguments with respect to State Farm's duties
before the Letter Agreement was executed.

1.

The Policy required State Farm to pay for replacement cost.

The parties essentially agree that there are two types of payments to an insured for
property loss under the Policy. The first payment is only relevant to State Farm's obligation to
pay the "actual cash value at the time of the loss of the damaged part of the property" under
paragraph 1.<)..(1) of Section I - Loss Settlement, which provides as follows ("Paragraph 1"):
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until actual repair or replacement is completed, we will pay
only the actual cash value at the time of the loss of the
damaged part of the property, ... not to exceed the cost to
repair or replace the damaged part of the property....

(1)

(R. p. 109) (emphasis added). State Farm has labeled Paragraph 1 as the Actual Cash Value or

"ACV Paragraph." (Respondent's Brief, p. 26.). By State Farm's own admission, the actual
cash value loss "applies until the repair of the fire loss is completed." (Id.).
The second payment is located in paragraph 1.a.(2) of Section I - Loss Settlement, which
provides as follows ("Paragraph 2"):

(2)

when the repair or replacement is actually completed, ~
will pay the covered additional amount you actually and
necessarily spend to repair or replace the damaged part
of the property. , ..

(R. p. 109) (emphasis added). State Farm has labeled Paragraph 2 as the Replacement Cost or

"RC Paragraph." (Id.).

Again by State Farm's own admission, the amount paid under this

paragraph is usually more than the actual cash value under paragraph 1 or the ACV Paragraph.
(Id.).

In the present case, State Farm alleges that it paid the Linfords the actual cash value

before the repair was completed of $153,751.40. (Id.). State Farm then alleges that after the
repairs were completed, State Farm "calculated and paid an additional amount of $43,314.27 in
replacement cost, which subsumed the ACV amount already paid." (Id. at p. 27). This statement
is incorrect. State Farm did initially estimate the cost to repair the fire damage to the Home to be
$153,751.40 and paid that amount; however, State Farm did not pay a lump sum replacement
cost amount of $43,314.27. In fact, Dave's asserted throughout the repair that State Farm's
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estimate was too low, and State Farm actively negotiated with Dave's in attempting to settle the
dispute. For instance, on June 10, 2008, State Farm sent a letter directly to Dave's stating that
Dave's has made a claim for additional repairs to the Home of $114,245.62 in excess of the
original $153,751.40. (R. p. 283). State Farm then stated that based on State Farm's evaluation
of Dave's claim, State Farm owed Dave's an additional $34,512.86.

(ld.).

This evidence

establishes that State Farm did not simply pay the Linfords the actual cash value and later pay a
lump sum for the replacement cost. Rather, State Farm revised its actual cash value based upon
its negotiations with Dave's, which go the heart of the Linfords' claims for breaching the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and insurance bad faith. State Farm ultimately failed to
pay Dave's the entire replacement cost it was asserting, which then led to this lawsuit.
At first blush, the fact that the payments were not made in compliance with the Policy
may seem to be innocuous. However, this fact establishes that there was a question of what the
replacement cost was until well after the Home repairs were complete. That issue still remains,
and as State Farm has admitted, Dave's alleges that it cost an additional amount of $114,245.62
over the actual cash value amount to repair the fire damage to the Home. Clearly Dave's, and by
extension the Linfords, disputes that State Farm has paid for the replacement cost to repair the
fire damage.
The Linfords submit that because the repair was completed, which is not in dispute, the
Policy requires State Farm to pay the amount the Linfords "actually and necessarily" spend to
repair the Home under Paragraph 2 or the RC Paragraph. The Linfords further submit that if the
trier of fact agrees with Dave's and finds that the amount Dave's is entitled to recover for the
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repair of the fire damage to the Home is in excess of the amount State Farm has paid to date, then
State Farm will owe the additional amount awarded by the trier of fact under the express terms of
the Policy because that amount will be what the Linfords "actually and necessarily" spend to
repair the Home. State Farm has all but admitted that this analysis is correct. State Farm's only
argument is that the Letter Agreement precludes any recovery by the Linfords for the replacement
cost. This argument, however, is without merit.

2.

The Letter Agreement and the Policy are essentially the same.

The Linfords submit that the Letter Agreement only made one minor modification to the
Policy: the parties jointly appointed one appraiser and State Farm agreed to pay all of his fees and
expenses. State Farm argues that the Letter Agreement made "nine modifications" to the Policy.
(Respondent's Brief, p. 4). A comparison of the Letter Agreement and that appraisal paragraph
of the Policy establishes that State Farm is incorrect:
Letter Agreement (R. p. 188)

Appraisal Paragraph (R. p. 112)

1. "The parties agree to resolve and set the 1. "If you and we fail to agree on the amount
amount of loss under Coverage A of the Policy of loss, either one can demand that the amount
by appraisal."
of loss be set by appraisal."
2. "The parties will jointly appoint Mike

Berkson as their appraiser."

"If either makes a written demand for
appraisal, each shall select a competent,
disinterested appraiser."
2.

3. "The insured and State Farm will be 3. Silent as to this issue
allowed to provide Mr. Berkson documents and
information for his consideration."
4. "Should Mr. Berkson have questions or 4. Silent as to this issue.
require additional information, he should share
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such inquires with both parties."
5. "The insureds will allow Mr. Berkson 5. Silent as to this issue.
access to the insured dwelling, if requested for
purposes of performing his appraisal."
6. "Mr. Berkson will determine the cost to 6. "The appraisers shall then set the amount of
repair damages to the dwelling, caused by the loss."
fire, as if he was a contractor on the date of
loss (amount of loss)."
"Mr. Berkson will provide a written 7. "Written agreement signed by any two of
7.
appraisal of the amount of loss to the insured these three shall set the amount of loss."
and State Farm."

8. "The parties agree to be bound by the 8. "the amount agreed upon shall be the
written appraisal."
amount of the loss."
9. "State Farm will pay Mr. Berkson (sic) fees 9. The parties are each required to appoint an
and expenses as the parties' joint appraiser."
appraiser.

The only substantive difference between the Letter Agreement and the Policy is that the
parties jointly appointed Mr. Berkson as an appraiser. To achieve this change, the parties agreed
to share information with Mr. Berkson. While language different from the Policy may have been
used in the Letter Agreement, the Letter Agreement did not make any substantive changes to the
appraisal paragraph of the Policy other than the joint appointment of Mr. Berkson.

3.

Mr. Berkson only determined the Actual Cash Value ofthe loss.

Both the Letter Agreement and the appraisal paragraph of the Policy require the appraiser
to determine the "amount of loss" on the date of the loss. It is axiomatic that the date of the loss
occurred before repair was completed. This is a crucial fact because of the language contained in
both the ACV Paragraph:
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(1)

until actual repair or replacement is completed, we will pay
only the actual cash value at the time of the loss of the
damaged part of the property, ... not to exceed the cost to
repair or replace the damaged part of the property....

(R. p. 109) (emphasis added), and the RC Paragraph:

(2)

when the repair or replacement is actually completed, we
will pay the covered additional amount you actually and
necessarily spend to repair or replace the damaged part
of the property ....

(R. p. 109) (emphasis added).
By State Farm's own admission, the "amount of loss" at the "time of loss" was
determined by Mr. Berkson to be $205,757.63. (Respondent's Brief, p. 7; R. p. 188). The
amount of loss is found under the ACV paragraph, which is the "cash value at the time of the
loss."

Mr. Berkson did not determine, and was not engaged to determine, the amount the

Linfords "actually and necessarily spend to repair or replace the damaged part of the property,"
which is the replacement cost to repair the Home. State Farm has admitted that the replacement
cost exceeds the actual cash value.

(Respondent's Brief, p. 26). By State Farm's own

admissions, the Linfords have not been paid for the replacement cost of the Home.

4.

The Appraisal Paragraph and the Letter Agreement only determine ACV
value.

The Appraisal Paragraph of the Policy provides that if the Linfords and State Farm "fail
to agree on the amount of loss, either one can demand that the amount of the loss be set by
appraisal." (R. p. 112) (emphasis added). This language only refers to the actual cash value of
the loss under the ACV Paragraph.
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The ACV Paragraph provides as follows: "until actual repair or replacement is completed,
we will pay only the actual cash value at the time of the loss of the damaged part of the
property." (R. p. 109) (emphasis added). The RC paragraph provides that after repairs are
completed, State Farm will pay the amount the Linfords "actually and necessarily" spend to
repair the Home.

Comparing this language to the Appraisal Paragraph, it is clear that the

Appraisal Paragraph only applies to the ACV Paragraph because that is the only paragraph that
refers to "the loss." This makes sense because before repairs are completed, State Farm and its
insureds could clearly differ on the amount of loss whereas, after the repairs are completed, the
relevant amount is the amount that the insureds "actually and necessarily" spend to repair the
damage to the property. At worst, there is at least an ambiguity as to whether the appraisal
paragraph applies to the RC Paragraph because the Appraisal Paragraph does not discuss or even
refer to the amount the Linfords "actually and necessarily" spent to repair the Home.
Even assuming the Appraisal Paragraph is ambiguous, the Letter Agreement addresses
the ambiguity because the Letter Agreement states that "Mr. Berkson will determine the cost to
repair damages to the dwelling, caused by the fire, as if he was a contractor on the date of loss

(amount of loss).,,3 (R. p. 188) (emphasis added). This language clearly refers to the ACV
Paragraph because a contractor on the date of loss cannot determine replacement cost, as the
replacement would not have occurred on the date of loss. State Farm even goes further by using
the same language in the Letter Agreement that is in the Appraisal Paragraph: "amount of loss,"

3 "Date of loss" is nearly identical to the language used in the ACV Paragraph: "time of loss." "Amount of loss" is
the exact language used in the Appraisal Paragraph. Nowhere are the words "actually and necessarily spent" used,
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and defines that amount as the loss on the date of loss. Again, such a loss would be before the
replacement cost was determined. By the terms of the Letter Agreement, which State Farm
drafted, it is clear that State Farm agrees with the Linfords that the Appraisal Paragraph only
applies to the ACV Paragraph, even though State Farm now appears to regret this agreement.
State Farm seems to accept the validity of this argument because State Farm states as
follows: "This Letter Agreement misdefined the calculation of the amount of the loss used in
either the ACV or RC Paragraphs."

(Respondent's Brief, p. 22) (emphasis added).

This

argument is nothing more than a red herring. The Letter Agreement is clear. Mr. Berkson was
engaged to determine the "amount of loss" "on the date of loss." The Letter Agreement, which
State Farm drafted, could easily have stated that Mr. Berkson was engaged to determine the
amount the Linfords "actually and necessarily spend" to repair or replace the damaged part of the
property. Of course, the Linfords would have never signed such an agreement because such
language is beyond the purpose of the Appraisal Paragraph.
The Linfords submit that both the Appraisal Paragraph and the Letter Agreement only
apply to the actual cash value of the loss on the date of the loss. State Farm drafted the Letter
Agreement, which directly follows this submission. Now, post hoc, State Farm attempts to argue
that Mr. Berkson's charge was to determine the amount the Linfords "actually and necessarily"
spent to repair the Home. Because State Farm drafted the Letter Agreement, and because the
Letter Agreement is clear, unambiguous and specific as to the loss Mr. Berkson was engaged to
find, it is respectfully submitted that State Farm's argument should be rejected by this Court.

except in the RC Paragraph.
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It must be noted that even if this Court is unclear as to whether the Linfords' submission
is correct, then there is an ambiguity in the Policy because it is reasonably subject to more than
one interpretation.

Cherry v. Coregis Ins. Co., 146 Idaho 882, 884, 204 P.3d 522, 524 (2009).

In that instance, the law specifies that "an objective standard should be applied to effeCtuate the

intent of the parties." Permann v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 108 Idaho 192, 194,697 P.2d 1206, 1208
(Ct. App. 1985). Moreover, any ambiguities are resolved in favor of the insured and, if the
language can reasonably be given two interpretations, one which permits recovery and another
which does not, Idaho law gives preference to the interpretation which favors the insured.

Cherry, 146 Idaho at 884, 204 P.3d at 524. Based upon this law, if this Court agrees that the
Policy can be read so that both the Appraisal Paragraph and the Letter Agreement only apply to
the actual cash value of the loss on the date of the loss, rather than to the amount the Linfords
"actually and necessarily" spent to repair the Home, then the Linfords must prevail.

It is

respectfully submitted that such a determination would be favored because it is clearly the
purpose of the insurance. Intermountain Gas Co. v. Industrial Indem. Co. of Idaho, 125 Idaho
182, 185, 868 P.2d 510, 513 (CL App. 1994).

5.

This case is not determined by Mr. Berkson's appraisal.

State Farm alleges that the Linfords "agreed to be bound by the [appraisal] process and
the result." (Respondent's Brief, p. 23). State Farm further argues that the appraisal process is
tantamount to arbitration and the Linfords' appeal is somehow improper. (Respondent's Brief, p.
24). This argument is without merit.
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First, the Linfords agree that they are bound by the appraisal. However, the Linfords are
bound by what the appraisal was intended to do, and what the Letter Agreement specified:
namely, the appraisal would "determine the cost to repair damages to the dwelling, caused by the
fire, ... on the date of the loss (amount of loss)." (R. p. 188). State Farm ignores this language
and instead attempts to argue that the appraisal determined the amount the Linfords' "actually
and necessarily" spent to repair the Home, which language is not found in either the Appraisal
Paragraph or the Letter Agreement. It is respectfully submitted that State Farm's overreaching
argument that the Letter Agreement served as a final settlement agreement in this matter be
rejected.
State Farm then attempts to argue that the appraisal is akin to arbitration. Clearly, an
appraisal is not an arbitration, and while the Linfords are bound by the amount of the appraisal,
the appraisal does not act as a determination by a binding arbitrator. State Farm's arguments to
the contrary should be rejected.
Finally, State Farm takes the position that whether "the Appraisal Paragraph applies to a
determination of the amount of loss under the ACV or RC Paragraphs is irrelevant."
(Respondent's Brief, p. 27). This argument is completely without merit.
State Farm had an obligation under the Policy to pay for the amount the Linfords
"actually and necessarily" spent to repair the Home. It is undisputed that Mr. Berkson did not
appraise the amount the Linfords "actually and necessarily" spent to repair the Home. Instead,
Mr. Berkson found the actual cash value at the time of the loss. How could Mr. Berkson have
determined the amount the Linfords "actually and necessarily" spent to repair the Home on the

APPELLANTS' BRIEF -14
00406564.000

date of the loss? The answer is simple: he could not have. State Farm's misguided attempts to
argue that the appraisal did something other than what was stated in the agreement-to determine
the amount of loss on the date of loss-should be rejected by this Court.
6.

The Linfords' Reliance on Kane v. State Farm Fire is not misplaced.

In the Linfords' initial brief, the Linfords submitted that State Farm has argued in other

cases that once repairs are completed the homeowner will ultimately be made whole. In support
of this submission, the Linfords cited to Kane v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 841 A.2d 1038
(Pa. 2004). The Linfords noted in their analysis that "Kane is not directly on point," but cited to
Kane because "the policies at issue in Kane include the same Paragraph 2." Of particular

relevance, the Linfords cited to Kane because of a certain admission made by State Farm in
Kane. That admission was as follows:
Kane noted that "there is no concern ... that the insured will not
be made whole" because State Farm has "conceded liability for
replacement costs once Appellants undertake to repair or replace
the damage to their properties." Id. at 1050 (emphasis added).

State Farm argues that this "admission" was not made by State Farm and was instead made by
other insurer defendants. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 35-36). State Farm then once again belittles
the Linfords by stating that their reliance on Kane "is the epitome of the frivolous, unreasonable
and unsupportable nature of the Linfords' appeal." (Respondent's Brief, p. 36).
Admittedly, the Linfords cited to language in Kane that did not apply to State Farm. This
was an error. However, State Farm did concede liability for replacement costs once repairs are
made in other portions of Kane.
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The State Farm policy at issue in Kane was a "replacement cost" home owner's insurance
policy, the same type of policy at issue here. Kane, 841 A.2d at 1040. State Farm, as one of the
appellees in Kane, asserted that the homeowners "must first undertake to repair or replace the
damaged property before being fully compensated." Id. at 1041. State Farm, as one of the
appellees, asserted that until the repair was made, homeowners are only entitled to the "actual
cash value." /d. Finally, Kane directly quotes Paragraph 1 (the ACV Paragraph) and Paragraph
2 (the RC Paragraph) from the State Farm policy at issue, which contains the exact language as
the Policy at issue in the present case. Id. at 1042. Immediately before quoting State Farm's
policy, the Kane court states: State Farm "requires the insured first to endeavor to repair or
replace damage before full replacement costs will be proffered." Id.
State Farm apparently decided not to fully analyze Kane before drafting its Respondent's
Brief. The Linfords admit that their specific cites to Kane were incorrect, but Kane does stand
for the position that State Farm has admitted homeowners will be "fully compensated" once
repairs are completed. There is no doubt that State Farm made this admission before the Kane
court. In the present case, State Farm is essentially retracting this admission in Kane.
The Linfords completed the repair and replacement of the Home.

Based upon State

Farm's admissions in Kane, the Linfords should now be fully compensated. If Dave's is awarded
a judgment over the appraisal amount, such amount is owed by the Linfords and the Linfords will
clearly not be made whole despite fully complying with the conditions of the Policy. State Farm
is essentially denying liability and failing to guarantee reimbursement for the repair or
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replacement of the Home after it has been repaired. This position is inappropriate since it is in
direct contravention to the Policy and State Farm's admissions in Kane.
There must be a difference in the Policy between "actual cash value" and the amount the
Linfords "actually and necessarily" spend to repair the Home. This is the issue in the present
case, and one which State Farm never specifically addresses. The Linfords submit that the
difference can be found in Kane: once repairs are completed, the homeowner will be fully
compensated for the amount it cost to repair the property.4 Here, State Farm is attempting to
shirk this responsibility. It is respectfully submitted that the district court erred in holding that
there can be no breach of contract in this case because if Dave's prevails and State Farm fails to
reimburse the Linfords for the excess, State Farm will be in breach of the Policy.

B.

State Farm Has A Duty to Defend the Linfords.
State Farm argues that it has no duty to defend the Linfords under either Coverage L or

Coverage A of the Policy.

(Respondent's Brief, p. 9).

State Farm further argues that the

Linfords have made a new argument on appeal, namely that State Farm owes a duty to defend
under Coverage A of the Policy. Both of these arguments are without merit.

1.

Whether State Farm has a duty to defend under coverage A is not a new issue.

It is well established in Idaho that an appellate court is "limited to the evidence, theories

and arguments that were presented ... below." State v. Vierra, 125 Idaho 465, 469, 872 P.2d

At a minimum, this language is ambiguous because it "is reasonably subject to differing interpretations." Clark v.
Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 138 Idaho 538, 541, 66 P.3d 242, 245 (2002). In such a situation,
"the trier of fact must determine what a reasonable person would have understood the language to mean." /d.
Therefore, at a minimum, the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of State Farm, and this
Court should overturn the district court's ruling.
4
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728,731 (CL App. 1994). There can be no doubt that in the district court the Linfords submitted
the Policy, set forth their theory that State Farm owed a duty to defend under the Policy, and
argued that State Farm had a duty to defend. Nonetheless, State Farm argues that because the
Linfords did not argue below that State Farm had a duty to defend under a specific portion of the
Policy, the Linfords are precluded from raising such an argument on appeal. This argument puts
form over substance.
The Linfords argued below that State Farm has a duty to defend them under the Policy.
They set forth that same issue on appeaL There is no law precluding the Linfords from adding to
that argument on appeal. Indeed, State Farm's limited view on this issue would preclude any
party from bolstering their argument or even citing to new authority on appeal. If this Court
accepts State Farm's limited view, then there would be no reason to file additional briefing on
appeal because the parties would essentially be stuck with the exact arguments and authorities
they raised below. This certainly cannot be the law.
It should also be noted that the Linfords did raise this specific issue below. In their Third

Party Complaint, the Linfords alleged that State Farm "has an obligation under the Policy and/or
Idaho common law to indemnify Plaintiffs for any costs or expenses they incur in defending
against Dave's Inc., lawsuit, and any damages that are awarded to Dave's, Inc., in such lawsuit."
(R. p. 34). This same argument was also raised at the hearing by the Linfords' counsel:

What does a . . . homeowner understand? That if the
insurance company says go ahead and get your contractor, and hire
him based on our estimate, the homeowner would believe that the
insurance company should step in and - and help them out, not just
leave them - leave them out in the cold.
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(T. p. 19, 11. 17-22). Therefore, even if State Farm is correct and the Linfords were required to

specifically raise whether State Fann had a duty to defend under Coverage A, the Linfords
complied with this duty below and the issue is proper on appeal.

2.

State Farm has a duty to defend under Coverage A.

The Linfords submit that Paragraph 2 (the RC Paragraph) requires State Farm to step in
and defend the Linfords in the case against Dave's, as that case relates to the value of the work to
repair the fire damage to the Horne. This submission is based upon the fact that Paragraph 2
obligates State Farm to indemnify the Linfords for whatever amount the trier of fact decides
Dave's is owed under the Fire Damage Contract because this amount will be what the Linfords
"actually and necessarily" spend to repair the Horne. The law in support of this assertion is the
well-established rule that an insurer's duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify, and if
there is arguable potential for a claim to be covered by the policy, the insurer may not refuse to
defend the insured. Hoyle v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 367, 372, 375, 48 P.3d 1256, 1261,
64 (2002).

In response, State Farm argues that the Linfords' submission is in error because nowhere

in Section I of the Policy "is there any mention of or reference to a duty to defend."
(Respondent's Brief, p. 10). The problem with this argument is that it ignores the express
language in the Policy.
The Policy requires State Farm to pay the amount the Linfords "actually and necessarily"
spend to repair the Horne. Dave's lawsuit asserts that the Linfords have not fully compensated
Dave's to repair the fire damage to the Horne. If Dave's establishes at trial that it is entitled to
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more than has been paid to it to dateS for its repair of the fire damage to the Home, then State
Farm will not have paid the Linfords the amount they "actually and necessarily" spend to repair
the Home. Since there is no doubt that State Farm has a duty to indemnify the Linfords for the
amount they "actually and necessarily" spend to repair the Home, and since the duty to defend is
broader than the duty to indemnify, the law supports a finding that State Farm has a duty to
defend the Linfords against the portion of Dave's complaint that seeks damages under the Fire
Damage Contract.

3.

State Farm has a duty to defend under Coverage L.

Coverage L of the Policy provides that coverage applies if "a claim is made or a suit is
brought against an insured for damages because of ... property damage." (R. p. 113). The
Linfords and State Farm's positions on this issue are well documented. State Farm argues that
Dave's "Complaint does not allege a covered 'occurrence'" because Dave's is not seeking to
recover for property damage or bodily injury. (R. p. 158). The Linfords submit that Dave's
claims were brought "because of' property damage caused by an occurrence. In the interest of
brevity, the Linfords will only address certain points raised by State Farm in its brief.
State Farm argues that "Dave's Complaint seeks damages because the Linfords failed to
pay for services rendered." (Respondent's Brief, p. 16). Again, this argument ignores that State
Farm is liable for those services because it is obligated to pay the amount the Linfords "actually
and necessarily" spend to repair the Home.

5

Had State Farm fully compensated Dave's, this

Based upon the record, Dave's has been paid more than Mr. Berkson's estimate. See n. 2 supra.
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lawsuit would not have occurred. Indeed, Dave's Complaint seeks damages because State Farm,
not the Linfords, failed to pay for Dave's services to repair the fire damage to the Home.
State Farm next argues that Dave's lawsuit did not arise "because of . . . property
damage," but because of "the Linfords' decision not to pay what is owed under their contracts
with Dave's." (Respondent's Brief, p. 17). First, the not so subtle suggestion in this sentence is
that the Linfords are attempting to receive an unfair benefit under the Remodeling Contract. As
addressed above, this is not the case because the Linfords actually overpaid Dave's under the
Remodeling Contract.

Second, had the Home not been damaged by fire, the Fire Damage

Contract would never have been executed. Hence, Dave's Complaint arose "because of' the fire
damage.
State Farm next attempts to explain why Magic Valley Potato Shippers v. Continental
Ins., 112 Idaho 1073, 1076-77, 739 P.2d 372, 375-76 (1987), is on point.

The Linfords

adequately distinguished Magic Valley in their opening Brief. Nonetheless, State Farm argues
that it "matters not that the policy at issue in Magic Valley was a commercial general liability
policy." (Respondent's Brief, p. 18), This argument is curious because State Farm previously
indicated in its brief that "the only documents to be reviewed to determine whether a duty to
defend exists are Dave's Complaint and the insurance policy." (Respondent's Brief, p. 11).
Despite this statement, State Farm argues that this Court can look for guidance from a case
where: (1) there was no property damage; (2) the type of insurance discussed and analyzed was a
completely different type of insurance from the case at bar; and (3) the policy in question
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contained a specific exclusion for breach of contract that is not included in the present case.
State Farm's reliance on Magic Valley is simply misplaced.
State Farm then argues that Coverage L "excludes from liability from coverage for
property damage to the Linfords' property."

(Respondent's Brief, p. 19).

This argument,

however, misses the point and contradicts State Farm's own analysis. "An insurer's duty to
defend arises upon the filing of a complaint whose allegations, in whole or in part, read broadly,
reveal potential for liability that would be covered by insured's policy."

Construction

Management Systems, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of America, 135 Idaho 682, 682, 23 P.3d 142, 144

(2001). Here, Dave's filed its lawsuit when he was not fully compensated to repair the fire
damage to the Home. Dave's did not file its lawsuit for coverage to the Linfords' property, but
because of the failure of State Farm to pay to repair the damage to the Linfords' property.
Moreover, State Farm argues that Dave's lawsuit did not arise "because of ... property damage."
(Respondent's Brief, p. 17). Accordingly, the exclusion cited by State Farm has no bearing to
the present dispute.
Essentially, the question of whether Coverage L requires State Farm to provide a defense
to Dave's claim can be framed in a question: if the fire damage had not occurred would Dave's
have filed the present lawsuit? If the answer to that question is no, then Coverage L requires
State Farm to provide a duty to defend because Dave's claim was brought "because of' property
damage caused by an occurrence. Here, there can be no doubt that without the fire damage,
Dave's would not have filed a claim against the Linfords. As such, Dave's claim was brought
"because of' an occurrence.
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C.

The District Court Erred in Dismissing the Linfords' Claim for Breach of the
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.
State Farm's only discussion with respect to whether the district court erred in dismissing

the Linfords' claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is simply to argue
this claim cannot be a stand-alone cause of action. (Respondent's Brief, p. 37). The Linfords
submit that based upon the foregoing analysis, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not a
stand-alone cause of action in this case because State Farm breached the contract by not
providing a defense, and will be in breach of the contract if Dave's is awarded any additional
damages.
Of particular importance, State Farm failed to address the Linfords' assertion that there is
sufficient evidence of record without resolution of Dave's claim to find that State Farm has
already breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Such facts are fully briefed in the
Linfords' opening Brief and will not be restated herein. It is sufficient to note simply that State
Farm was aware in April 2008, at the latest, that Dave's questioned the accuracy of the Initial
Estimate. (R. p. 283). It was not two years later, in October 2010, that State Farm increased the
amount that was due to the Linfords based upon the Appraisal Paragraph. While the Linfords
submit that the Appraisal Paragraph is not binding on the Linfords' request for the actual amount
spent on repairs, State Farm's delay and actions over these two years evidence a violation of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Specifically, State Farm's delay and action have

significantly hindered any chance the Linfords would have to settle with Dave's because of State
Farm's direct negotiation and subsequent increase of the estimates. It is respectfully submitted
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that because State Farm did not address these arguments that this Court should overturn the
district court's ruling that granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm on the Linfords'
claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

D.

The District Court Erred in Dismissing the Linfords' Insurance Bad Faith Claim.
Similar to its response to the Linfords' claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and

fair dealing, State Farm only argues that if this Court disagrees with the Linfords' assertions
above, State Farm did not commit bad faith. State Farm, however, did not address the Linfords'
assertions that State Farm acted in bad faith by not initiating the Appraisal process sooner. The
Linfords submit that State Farm acted in bad faith for the reasons set forth above. However, at a
minimum, there is a question of fact as to whether State Farm unreasonably delayed in paying the
additional funds to such an extent that it could lead the trier of fact to conclude that State Farm
acted in bad faith.

Because State Farm did not address these arguments the district court's

decision dismissing the Linfords' bad faith claims should be overturned.

E.

State Farm is Not Entitled to Attorneys' Fees.
State Farm requests attorneys' fees under Idaho Code § 41-1839(4). State Farm argues

that it is entitled to attorneys' fees under section 41-1839(4) because the Linfords' appeal was
'''brought,

pursued,

or

defended

frivolously,

unreasonably

or without

foundation.'"

(Respondent's Brief, p. 38). State Farm's argument is misplaced.
For the reasons set forth above, the Linfords appeal is clearly not frivolous, unreasonable
or without foundation. The language of the Policy, which the district court did not thoroughly
analyze, clearly requires State Farm to reimburse the Linfords the amount they "actually and
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necessarily" spend to repair the Home. The district court's ruling essentially relieves State Farm
from this obligation. At a minimum, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to
State Farm as the Policy is at worst ambiguous. Finally, State Farm did not even address some of
the assertions raised by the Linfords with respect to their claims of breaching the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing and insurance bad faith. At a minimum, whether State Farm's delay
amounted to a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing or insurance bad faith is
clearly a good faith argument that precludes an award of attorneys' fees to State Farm.

F.

The Linfords Are Entitled to Attorneys' Fees.
The Linfords request attorneys' fees on appeal under LA.R. 41,

I.e.

§§ 41-1839(1) and

(4), and LC. § 12-123. State Farm argues that the Linfords are not entitled to attorneys' fees
under section 41-1839 because "there has been no determination that State Farm ... owes any
amount to the Linfords." This argument is misplaced, however, because section 41-1839 states:
"Any insurer ... which shall fail for a period of thirty (30)
days after proof of loss has been furnished ... to pay to the person
entitled thereto the amount justly due under such policy, ... shall
in any action thereafter brought against the insurer . . . pay such
further amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's
fees in such action."
Idaho Code § 41-1839(1). It is clear under section 41-1839 that the Linfords are entitled to
attorneys' fees because this is an action brought against the insurer for failure to pay the amount
Dave's. asserts it is entitled to. Accordingly, the Linfords are entitled to the attorneys' fees they
incurred in the district court and the attorneys' fees they are incurring on appeaL
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V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons argued above, the Linfords request this Court to reverse the district
court's award of summary judgment in favor of State Farm. This Court should rule as a matter of
law that State Farm has a duty to defend and a duty to indemnify the Linfords in the action with
Dave's and that State Farm breached the Policy and acted in bad faith in contesting this issue.

DATED this 31 st day of January, 2012.
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED

By:_G~~_-_
Corey J. Rippee, of the firm
Attorneys for Appellants
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